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INTRODUCTION 
The early 1990s saw substantial changes in the Horn, especially in terms 
of politics and socio-economic organization. Previous dictatorial structures 
chaacterized by political stagnation and economic crises were brought 
down by demands for democratization, economic restructuring, ethno-
regional rights and state independence. The process of change in Ethiopia 
after demise of the Mengistu regime in 1991 resulted in a remarkable turn 
toward 'ethnicization' of political and public life under a Transitional 
Government (TOE) led by the former rebel movement Ethiopian Peoples' 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EHADIG, in its Amharic and Tigrinya 
acronym). Explicit recognition of ethnic groups or 'nationalities' as units 
on which to base political parties and regional administrative structures is 
being incorporated in the new constitution and being adopted in education 
and language policies. Whether positive or negative, its future effects on 
development policy execution, through the Ethiopian government or 
through foreign NGOs, will be significant. 
For some observers, these changes in state structure and national dis-
course hold an example for other African countries, while for others -
recalling violent ethnic clashes of the past - they are a recipe for disaster 
(cf. Walle 1993). Be that as it may, this new discourse on national identity, 
ethnic group relations and the 'development effort' will shape future social 
and politico-economic developments, if only by creating new ideological 
realities. 
In the past few years, the new decentralizing approach affected some 
ethno-regional groups more than others. Larger ethnic groups have (often 
forcibly) been involved in political and ideological struggles to redefine 
their 'identities' within a new national political arena, the boundaries of 
which are still contested. But other groups remain at the margins. Recent 
151 
152 Developments from withm Suri Society 
discourse on change and development has been mrunly confined to ideo-
logical squibs related to the TOE's ethnic policy-approach and to the criti-
cism of its various rivals such as the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front), the 
AAPO (All-Amhara Peoples' Organization), the COEDF (Coalition of 
Ethiopian Democratic Forces), or the SEPDF (Southern Ethiopian 
Peoples' Democratic Front). Less attention has been paid to local-level 
perceptions and aspirations of average inhabitants not involved in party or 
ethnic politics. Here, first hand data- even on large 'nationalities' like 
Amhara, Oromo, Tigray, Sidama, Wolaita, Mar, etc.- are indeed scarce. 
In this chapter, I describe responses to recent socio-ecological crisis and 
political process among the Suri, an agro-pastoral group in Ethiopia's 
southwestern Klifa Region. Data come from fieldwork done after the 
change of regime in 1991. Effects of natural disaster as well as political 
changes are considered in order to trace the recent history of a group only 
marginally involved in national politics. Even at this level however, 
important points about national politics, ethnicization and group relations 
arise. 
The Suri number about 24,000,1 1ive in a remote border-area of Ethiopia 
and Sudan, and are perhaps even less touched by 'outside forces' than the 
famous Yanomamo, described by Chagnon (1992) as one of the world's 
last 'true' tribal peoples. News about the Suri is never reported anywhere, 
not even in the Ethiopian press. 
In past decades, the Suri witnessed serious ecological and societal 
crises. They faced drought, crop shortages, cattle disease, and violent con-
frontations with neighbouring peoples, leading to severe disruption of tra-
ditional modes of subsistence and serious reduction of their population. As 
they were at Ethiopia's politico-economic margins, they were not provided 
with substantial external aid from either the government or international 
aid agencies. Through various strategies like temporary migration, 
increased hunting and gathering, exploitation of gold resources and invest-
ment in, and use of, automatic weapons for attack and defence, a group 
response to societal survival was formulated. It cuhninated in full recovery 
of the economic and socio-cultural fabric of their society, but at the cost of 
increasing isolation and violent conflict with all their neighbours, in-
cluding the former Derg administration as well as the new EHADIG 
authorities. 
The Suri, as a relatively homogeneous and solidary population, must be 
considered as one interacting part in the wider natural and socio-political 
environment, i.e., not only must determining factors in their eco-niche be 
taken into account bqt also those of the regional-political context of the 
Ethiopian state, of which they and most of their neighbours nominally 
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have been a part since 1898. Both spheres impinge on each other and con-
sideration of developments after 1991 are of interest to evaluate changes 
in a long-term perspective. Part of the story of then successful 'mdi-
genous' recovery is indeed that of their changing political relations 
with other ethnic groups and agents in their area. 
THE SURI ENVIRONMENT AND SUBSISTENCE SYSTEM 
It is of course impossible to speak of ethnic or tribal groups as if they were 
'primitive isolates', but the Suri can be described as a relatively remote 
and untouched population. Their area is one of the most inaccessible and 
neglected parts of Ethiopia. It was nominally conquered in 1898, when the 
army of Ethiopian emperor Menilik II passed southward to the borders of 
British-held territories (Sudan and Kenya). Even today, after ninety years 
of nominal incorporation in the Ethiopian state, there are no government 
offices, no services, no transport facilities, no police or army posts in the 
Suri area (National Atlas of Ethiopia 1988: 35, and local information in 
Maji), and economic exploitation of the area is marginal. The advantage of 
this isolated position has been that the Suri were not bothered for taxes or 
other civil duties.2 They neither have (and never had) k'ebeles (local 
administrative units) or peasant associations, and are virtually autonomous 
in the maintenance of internal social order. Because of this image of 
remoteness, however, they have been sought out by foreign tourists 
seeking 'exotic tribes'. The appearance and peculiar behaviour of these 
tourists during the 1980s (paying Suri for photographs, trying to buy or 
swap their artefacts, etc.) has had negative effects on the Suri, who now 
are wary of all outsiders.3 
The Suri consist of two subgroups: Tinna and Chai.4 Research was done 
among the latter. The Suri linguistically belong to the Southeast-Surmic 
language group (within the 'Nilo-Saharan' family), about which little 
information is available.5 They practice shifting cultivation of sorghum 
and maize (on a fairly primitive technological level), some gardening, 
transhumant pastoralism, and hunting and gathering. 
Environmental Conditions 
The Suri eco-niche - a limited natural environment with which they inter-
act to find most of the products to sustain themselves - is a semi-arid 
lowland zone, between 500 and 1000 metres in altitude,6 covering about 
4400 sq. km, which, obviously, is not fully inhabited everywhere. 
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According to the National Atlas of Ethiopia (see note 6), rainfall is 
between 800 and 1200 mm per year. The average is certainly below 
1000 mm, and the pattern is rather unreliable, especially further south 
from the Dizi mountains. Rain is insufficient for permanent, intensive agri-
culture, and- as the drought-and-famine crises of the 1980s show- even 
for shifting cultivation of maize and sorghum. Most soils are fertile but 
rocky, and hardly suitable for plough agriculture. Vegetation cover con-
sists of bushed shrubland, wooded grassland and remnants of riparian 
wood or shrubland along the Kibish River. The tse-tse fly is not wide-
spread in the area, which means that, in principle, conditions for cattle-
keeping are good. Game animals were, until about two decades ago, 
abundant but have diminished due to ferocious hunting by local people.7 
One perennial river, the Kibish, crosses the Suri area from north to south, 
flowing down from the Maji mountains to the area of the Nyangatom 
people (who have a different language and culture). Five to ten kilometres 
west is a smaller river, the Kiba. Between these two rivers, the best Suri 
grazing land is found. There is no flood-retreat cultivation along the river 
banks, as among the Mursi people east of the Omo. At the end of the dry 
season (March-April), there is a problem of water and pasture shortage, 
with staple food supplies often precarious. 
Ethnic Relations 
Neighbouring the Suri are the Nyangatom in the south, the Dizi and Me'en 
in the north-east, the Anuak in the far northwest, and east across the Omo 
river the Mursi (only the latter are closely related to them in language and 
culture). 
Suri oral tradition maintains that they arrived in the lower Kibish and 
the Tirma range (a hill area north of Shulugui) at least fourteen genera-
tions ago,8 coming from the lower Omo River Valley, via the Dirga and 
Gherghetto hills. When they moved into their present habitat (including 
the now vacated part close to Shulugui), they did not find other people 
there; their Nyangatom neighbours (part of the 'Karimojong-cluster' and 
closely related to the Turkana) arrived later. With the Nyangatom (or 
'Bume' as they call them), the Suri have always had a very tense relation-
ship, although in times of relative peace the two groups had ritual bond-
friendships and exchange partners. When moving to the north fringe of the 
Kibish valley, the Suri encountered the Dizi, long-settled agriculturalists 
in the highland zone. They established a ritual bond with them, under 
which the Dizi would perform a rain-ceremony for the Suri if they suf-
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fered from lack of rain in the valley. There is also a tradition that chiefly 
families of both groups are related and cannot intermarry. The groups 
were therefore traditionally on good terms. 
With the Anuak, the Suri have no positive relations whatsoever, unless 
one considers the recent trade in automatic rifles (in the Dima area) as 
such. With the Mursi they intermarry and exchange cattle and other 
resources. They are seen as similar to the Suri. Also with the Me'en (also a 
Surmic-speaking group, with historical and cultural affinities) there was 
some intermarriage, but now the groups avoid each other because of 
conflicts. There is only significant contact between the agro-pastoral Bodi-
Me'en (across the Omo River) and the eastern Suri who live below the Sai 
mountain, east of the town of Maji. 
In the early years of this century, northern immigrants (Amhara, 
Oromo, Tigray, Gurage, and others) arrived, in the wake of the imperial 
army led by Emperor Menilik II's general Ras Wolde Giorgis, who 
founded Maji town and also temporarily subdued (or thought he did) the 
Suri in adjacent lowlands. The area was then one of adventurers and 
traders who, from their base in Maji, roamed the lowlands to buy, 
exchange or rob cattle from pastoral peoples like the Nyangatom, 
Dassanetch and Suri. Some northerners became influential local figures 
who carved out political spheres of influence extending well into the 
Toposa and Turkana country, then nominally British. Before settlement of 
colonial boundaries with the British (1905-1920), the northern Turkana 
area, for instance, was effectively the territory of the highland-Abyssinians 
led by gerazmach Aberra, from Tigray.9 Turkana oral tradition (see 
Lamphear 1992:155-6, 162) knows him as Apara. 
In this century, the Suri oriented themselves to regional markets, espe-
cially Maji and Jeba, the two earliest highland villages founded in 1898, 
lying a three- to six-hour walk from their area. There they sold cattle and 
goats, and bought small trade items (cloth, salt, razor-blades, iron tools, 
grain). They also traded with Sudanese Bale and occasiona!ly Murle 
people (livestock, beads), but their main orientation was toward Ethiopia 
(evident from their exclusive use of Ethiopian currency). Also, in Haile 
Selassie's time, the Suri were (for a few decades) administered by 
Ethiopian officials, who founded police posts and appointed district repre-
sentatives in two small settlements in the area. While Ethiopian authorities 
were present, there was no effort to 'assimilate' the Suri. In terms of the 
hegemonic cultural ideology of the highlanders, the Suri were perhaps 
looked down upon- being seen as 'nomads', 'without religion', etc., and 
authorities' tried to discourage them from 'going around naked' and from 
inserting their large lip- and ear-plates. But the reverse was also true: the 
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Suri had a disdain bordering on contempt for the highlanders. From their 
point of view, the latter were marginal to their society. Thus, mutual dif-
ferences were recognized, with no party expectmg them to disappear. 
Despite contacts with various groups, the Suri have almost no 
proficiency in any other language than their own. If they have a second 
language it is, especially among the Tirma, Balethi, spoken by the closely-
related Bale people. Some speak Nyangatom or Dizi; Dizi women who 
marry Suri men stop speaking Dizi and their children only learn Tirma-
Chai. The Me' en, Anuak, or Murle languages are not spoken. Among the 
Chai, about thirty-five people speak Amharic, most of them former sol-
diers recruited by force or trickery for the National Army under Mengistu. 
On the basis of environmental and ethnic relations it can be concluded 
that the Suri eco-niche is not a stable set of natural conditions, but is 
highly sensitive to differing patterns of rainfall, wild and domestic animal 
movement and human use of and competition for limited resources. It is 
difficult to sketch a clear picture of the resource base and number of 
people in the early decades of this century Gust before the Northerners 
arrived, changing the political set-up with trade, slave-raiding, cattle-
rustling and a newly imposed administrative structure). But population 
distribution and settlement patterns at that time showed less density and 
less intensive resource use (e.g. of pasture, cultivation sites, trees and bush 
for firewood and building).10 
Transhumant pastoralism, shifting cultivation of sorghum and maize, 
gardening and hunting and gathering still form the core of Suri subsist-
ence. Fields for sorghum and maize (for which there still is sufficient 
unused bushland) are cleared and burned every year, although one plot 
may serve for two or three years. Technology is elementary: they only 
use machetes, hoes, and iron-pointed digging sticks. No other inputs 
(apart from collective labour, in exchange for sorghum beer) are known. 
As noted, the lower Kibish Valley provides excellent pasture for cattle. 
The Suri, recognizing herds as their security and future, invest any 
surplus in acquiring cattle. Cattle are not only used as food (blood, milk, 
occasionally meat) but also for clothing and utensils, constitute the main 
wealth transferred at marriage and have a role in many rituals. Also, the 
Suri keep goats and sheep. Leaves and fruits from various trees and 
shrubs are gathered especially by women and children. Women plant 
cabbage, pumpkin, gourds, peppers, and cassava - the only root-crop, but 
a major food resource. Hunting has always provided a good additional, 
though irregular, source of animal protein. In the early 1970s, Suri 
hunting was seriously restricted by the creation of the Omo National 
Park.U 
JonAbbink 157 
THE FAMINE CRISIS 
Over the past two centuries, the Suri suffered badly from drought and 
famine. Their oral traditions indicate that cattle epidemics were not 
unknown but it appears that they were less devastated by the big rinderpest 
epidemic and famine of the 1890s than other southern peoples, like the 
Tishana-Me'en, Dizi, Mursi or Dassanetch. The most recent serious cattle 
plague was the anthrax epidemic in the early 1970s (probably imported 
from Sudan), which made large tracts of traditional grazing area around 
Mount Shulugui and along the Tirma Range unusable. Also in the 1970s, 
drought caused severe crop failure and cattle death especially among the 
Chai (the Suri section east of the Kibish River). David Turton mentioned 
this crisis in his studies on the Mursi (cf. Turton and Turton 1984: 187). In 
these years, the Suri subsistence base was slowly undermined; numbers of 
cattle and people declined, crop yields were small, and gathering roots and 
fruits could not yield sufficient nutrition to sustain the population. Also, 
the Suri were earlier prevented from hunting in Omo National Park, which 
was guarded by (at that time, better armed) game wardens. Thus, the Suri 
had neither food-reserves (grain or cattle) nor sufficient weapons, i.e. they 
could not retaliate for cattle raids from their neighbours (mainly 
Nyangatom). 
In 1984 the rains failed again. The ensuing drought and famine period 
of 1984-85 forms the baseline for this analysis, although it must be 
emphasized that it had its precedents in a decade of crisis. In 1984-85, 
more Suri were dying because traditional responses of increased hunting 
and gathering, emergency selling of stock animals and raiding did not 
work and people were already weakened by preceding crisis years. 
Informants recall this period as the worst in recent history. In these years, 
the Suri lost several thousand people from all age-groups, and as the 
victims could not all be buried, corpses were left in the bush, covered with 
tree-branches and leaves. A possible contributory factor to the crisis, the 
increase of fatal contagious disease (intestinal infections, diarrhoea), 
cannot be assessed at the present state of knowledge, but was probably 
important'(see Kelly, this volume, Chapter 12) 
Following traditional crisis-responses, several Suri groups migrated 
north to the Tulgit area, a Dizi border area west of Jeba town, to find new 
forest/bush resources, new grazing or cultivation lands, and to be near the 
town. Some 1000 to 1200 Tirma (Suri living west of the Kibish River) 
crossed into Sudan to exchange cattle for grain with local Bale and Anuak 
people and to find new cultivation sites on the southern fringe of the Boma 
Plateau. (A similar Tirma migration occurred early in this century.) For 
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the same reasons, the Chai moved closer to the Maji foothills, considered a 
Dizi area For the Chai-Suri especially, an additional reason to move north 
was the persistent threat of the Nyangatom (see below). 
Meanwhile news of the crisis reached local administrators in Maji, and 
eventually the Jimma and Addis Ababa offices of the Ethiopian Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) were notified. With World Vision 
International, an emergency famine relief programme was set up late in 
1985. Planes landed at a small airstrip in the Kibish area (constructed by 
missionaries in the 1960s), and corn and grain were distributed. No camp 
was set up: the Suri collected their grain and returned to their homesteads 
nearby. Many lives were saved and, as in the similar Mursi case described 
by the Turtons (1984), no long~term dependency relationship was created 
between donors and recipients. 
The Suri had no indigenous conception of outside 'aid' or 'develop-
ment'. Aid by external groups was initially neither expected nor under-
stood. There were traditional ways of appealing to bond-friends among 
neighbouring ethnic groups - a kind of 'structural reciprocity' - but, 
significantly, this did not work in the 1980s. 
The Suri attitude toward outside agencies - which they only knew in the 
form of the Ethiopian government and a short-lived missionary effort in 
the 1960s-early 1970s12 - was sceptical and distant. They had had no 
contact with relief organizations when World Vision and the RRC stepped 
in. 13 While they eagerly accepted grain given to them, they noted that it 
was a short term non-reciprocal event, and that they ultimately would have 
to rely on their own meagre resources and get whatever they could by their 
own effort.14 
When the donors left after some months, natural and material condi-
tions had not substantially improved. Crops were poor, cattle were scarce, 
game resources outside the Park area were being seriously depleted, and 
no new inputs in terms of sowing grain, draught animals, etc. were 
supplied. Recovery of their subsistence base was thus left to the Suri 
themselves. 
INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICT, 1984-93 
The other major contributory factor to crisis, coinciding with subsistence 
problems in Suri society was that of inter-ethnic movements, especially in 
the Ethio-Sudan-Kenyan border area. In roughly the same years that 
famine affected them, violent conflict emerged with the Nyangatom, their 
immediate neighbours. Several factors explain Nyangatom aggression 
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towards the Suri: (a) pressure from Turkana people in Northern Kenya, 
who have steadily moved north, due to persistent drought, scarcity of 
grazing lands in their own habitat, and perhaps to political harrassment by 
Kenyan authorities. Several serious clashes with both parties were 
reported over the past decade, up to today; (b) high Nyangatom population 
growth and need for more grazing and cultivation sites, c) the southern 
Sudanese war. In 1982-4, the Toposa in Sudan acquired automatic rifles 
from either Sudanese government troops or illegal traders and traded them 
to the Nyangatom, their brethren and allies. Also, the Nyangatom bought 
them from traders and more recently may have gone as far as Malakal to 
get training and free weapons from government forces. 15 This gave the 
Nyangatom a decisive edge over their traditional enemies the Suri (called 
by them 'Nyikoroma', hill-dwellers). They pursued them in their home 
territory, causing a disproportionate toll of human life among the Suri and 
loss of many cattle and small stock and of traditional grazing areas near 
Mt Shulugui. 
One might even argue that this ecologically- and demographically-
motivated movement and its violent effects were the prime cause of star-
vation, because it undermined traditional Suri ability to respond to drought 
and crop-failure crises based on their own resources (i.e. cattle, hunting-
gathering, short-term migration). These developments forced them to con-
centrate in larger, more defensible villages, and (over-)exploit a more 
limited area. This resulted in relative crowding, depletion of bush 
resources for firewood, huts and cattle corrals, and in a fall in yields of 
cultivation sites (shorter fallow). The Nyangatom threat finally also 
induced the Suri to settle in their present locations along the upper Kibish, 
about 40 kilometres north of their core area. 
Although most have now (1994) lived for six to seven years in the Dizi 
border area, many Suri see this as exile: their real 'homeland' is near Mt 
Shulugui, the place, as they say, where their main rituals (like the long-
awaited age-set initiation ceremony) should be held. But although they 
claim (ideologically, so to speak) that they want to return there, they 
realize that it may already be too late. The Nyangatom have settled at the 
base of the Shulugui mountain and now urge district authorities to recog-
nize a new Nyangatom k'ebele on former Suri territory. They have also a 
strong EHADIG contingent there, partly made up of their own people.16 
In the meantime, the Suri's northward push into fringes of Dizi (and 
perhaps Me'en) territory continues. Whether they will settle in the high-
lands and adopt cultivation, is another matter; so far no Suri (either indi-
viduals or family groups) have moved out of Suri country permanently 
(for one insignificant exception, see note 14). 
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ADAPTIVE RESPONSE AND REGENERATION, 1988-92 
In February 1988, during my first visit, the Suri were still suffering from 
effects of drought and famine. However, in late 1991, they had substan-
tially recovered: many young children, large villages, large fields of 
sorghum and maize, herds restored to a remarkable degree compared with 
the 1985 situation. Migrant Suri even returned from Sudan to Ethiopia. 
Another indication of regained strength was that most adult males had an 
automatic rifle, the new symbol of power and male status. Next to the 
Nyangatom, the Suri thus became the best armed group in the area, and 
were (and still are) a serious threat to peace and security in the Maji area. 
One secret of their recovery was increased exploitation of a unique 
resource: gold. Lower parts of the Maji-Kibish and the Upper Akobo 
areas, especially in and near streambeds, have small deposits of gold 
which can be extracted by panning. This practice was known among Dizi 
and Anuak people. The latter mined gold near northern tributaries of the 
Akobo (Dima) river. Nobody knows exactly when this practice started, but 
it was probably during the Italian occupation (Italians sent prospecting 
teams to the area and set up a branch office of their mineral exploration 
company CO MINA near the Akobo ). The Suri say they became familiar 
with the practice about twenty years ago. But as mining is very hard work, 
often done for several weeks, outside the Suri area proper in a kind of no-
man's land, they had never fully exploited this resource before. Neither 
did they use gold for any purpose within their own society. Only external 
demand - traders in Jeba and Maji - finally urged them to take up gold-
mining in the drought years. It yielded substantial cash with which they 
bought tools, food, and cattle, and, later, weapons. For 4.5 grams of pure 
gold (the work of a few weeks' mining, including travelling), they 
received about 300 Ethiopian birr (in 1986-7, U$ 149), the price of one 
cow or bull, or two heifers. In 1991, the price was about 15 per cent 
higher, in mid-1993 again 5-10 per cent more. Thus, especially in 
1986-90, there was something of a native goldrush to the Akobo area. 
Gold was (illegally) sold not only to town-traders but also to Anuak 
people up north, who gave them cattle, bullets and Kalashnikovs in return 
(obtained from Sudanese army depots). Interestingly, the Suri never 
invested proceeds from gold in cultivation (i.e. in ploughs, draught 
animals (oxen), tools, other crop seeds like t'eff or wheat, in permanent 
housing, etc.) but only in these two elements allowing them to reinforce 
their hold on their traditional eco-niche: cattle and guns. The Suri saw the 
need to arm themselves in order to re-assert claims to their own traditional 
area in the face of efforts by, especially, the Nyangatom, to monopolize 
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resource mches (water sources, bush tracts and grazmg land) m the south-
em border area near Shulugui. In other words, they wanted to 'restore the 
balance'. But the newly acquired weapons also tempted Suri to rrud cattle 
from the Dizt, on whose lands they had steadily encroached since 1985. In 
1991, there were at least four big raids on Dizi settlements, in which close 
to a hundred Dizi were killed. In 1992 and 1993 this continued, while Suri 
armed youngsters killed several old Dizi chiefs and also defenceless Dizi 
girls carrying water or firewood, or farmers returning from fields. 
Numerous cattle were stolen and property destroyed. Trade routes between 
Maji and Jeba were constantly threatened, and people moving to markets 
(village people, Tishana, Dizi) were runbushed, robbed and killed. In 1993 
conflict escalated further so that large numbers of southern Dizi, tired of 
random killings, left their home areas to go north. Government action, 
either from the Derg or the EPRDF-led government, has been slow in 
coming but finally a crack-down of EHADIG-forces on the Suri at the end 
of 1993 seemed to have muted Suri aggression.17 
In sum, gold and use of violence not only helped the Suri to survive their 
subsistence crisis, but also to obtain new power. By investing and using 
automatic rifles their recovery turned out to be too successful, so to speak. 
Even though violence may be checked in the near future, at present it 
allows them to restore their way of life as they see fit. It is unlikely that the 
Suri- as sometimes expected by government or NGO representatives-
will make a transition to sedentary cultivation. The Turtons (1984) 
described such a settlement move by a part of the Mursi, who in a compa-
rable period of crisis went to live as cultivators in the Mago highland area. 
But nowadays, this experimental settlement (where no cattle could be 
kept due to tsetse) has largely been abandoned: most Mursi returned to 
the plains.18 The Suri, like the Mursi, are reluctant to live as farmers in 
the highland zone, especially if there is an option to regain a foothold in 
the pastoralist economy. Like the Mursi, the Suri see themselves as a free 
herding peoplo. Whatever cultural reasons there are for it, this attitude 
makes some economic sense: not only are the Suri relatively free from 
administration and tax-imposing government officials, they also can, in 
good years, accumulate much more wealth19 than, say, the Dizi or the 
Me'en, because of their substantial numbers of cattle. In addition, with 
their new weapons, the Suri also regained access to the last plentiful 
sources of game meat in Omo National Parks'. They were not disturbed by 
the Parks' grune wardens, who feared Suri fire-power, although in 1993 an 
EHADIG-force was stationed there, which will dtscourage large-scale 
hunting. Of course, Suri weaponry also enabled them better access to gold, 
exploitation of which they have tried to monopolize, pushing out the Dizi. 
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SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EFFECTS OF CRISIS 
The mairi effects of drought, famine and political upheaval on Suri society 
can be noticed in three domains. 
Socio-economic Organization 
Initially, in the worst famine period, domestic units became more 
independent, with solidarity between agnates, clan members or fellow vil-
lagers eroding as resources declined. Also, a 'split' in domestic groups 
occurred: males and females operated more independently of each other. 
Related to this were changes in labour organization - between males and 
females and in labour-tasks themselves - most of which proved to be 
shortterm. Male household heads were more mobile, hunting, visiting the 
relief distribution point, selling cattle in various places, begging for food 
(e.g. among the Dizi), and going to gold-mining places.2° Clearing and 
planting declined, as seeds were used for consumption. Women and young 
children spent more time gathering. Women seemed less affected by 
famine. The number of female victims was lower than that of males. In 
recent years, as the Suri recovered, this led to increased polygamous mar-
riages (also because of 'levirate' marriage: a man taking the wife (wives) 
of a deceased brother or other close agnatic relative). 
Trade with highland villagers increased after 1985. First, the Suri 
offered goats and cattle, in return for grain. Second, the role of gold as a 
commodity rapidly gained importance. In Maji and Jeba traders were 
happy to buy gold, which could be resold at a profit elsewhere. Increased 
market exchange, however, did not draw the Suri into the regional money 
economy. They used it to funnel resources into their own society, not to 
acquire other commodities except for salt, razor-blades or cloth. It was 
neither extensively used as measure of exchange, 'saving' or value within 
their own society: it was mainly seen as a medium for dealing with 
outsiders. 
Internal Political Relations 
A notable long-term effect was a change in the balance between genera-
tions within Suri society: elders (in Suri: bara, or in general, kumin) versus 
youngsters and younger married men (tegay) and junior elders (rora). 
Although the three komoru, or 'ritual leaders', retained their prestigeous 
(hereditary) position, their effective influence declined. Their advice on 
raiding, location of new fields or villages, control of ceremonial duelling 
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contests, or on occasional government directives or proposals, was lis-
tened to but not seen as binding. Their mediatory functions were still 
called upon (during group conflict or public meetings) but their authority 
or 'executive power' (already poor in the traditional system) was reduced 
to virtually nothing in the years of crisis. 
To illustrate, we look in some detail at a central Suri ritual, ceremonial 
male duelling (sagine). This is done with poles (dongen, sg. donga) of 
tough kallochi wood (Grewia mollis Juss.), 2.10 to 2.40 metres in length. 
Contestants are young men of the tegay age-grade (unmarried) from dif-
ferent territorial settlements and/or clans. They hold several matches and 
return-matches over a period of a few months every year. The.short fights 
have to be supervised by referees (odda). In functionalist terms one might 
maintain that these contests 'regulate' internal tensions generated 
between competing village communities in Suri society, in allowing 
young, ambitious men, eager to start life as independent household heads 
to show their strength and virility in a socially accepted manner (this 
aspect is explicitly recognized by nubile Suri girls). There is certainly 
more in it than this, but in fact the actual level of violence (harrassment, 
assault, theft, murder) within Suri society is low. However, the important 
point is that the sagine institution has undergone notable changes in the 
past six to seven years. First, frequency of contests has much increased. 
They are held almost every two to three weeks over a period of three to 
four months after the main sorghum harvest (September-November, and 
after that as well (e.g. in January and in the first rains in April-May). 
Second, influence of elders (including the komoru) and referees over con-
testing parties has diminished: nowadays, young men continue as they 
like, and after one party has 'lost' a contest, they grab their Kalashnikovs 
and start shooting (usually, but not always, in the air) to show their irrita-
tion. Suri elders say the game has lost much of its former attraction and 
its meaning is being eroded. 
The increase in the number of contests is, from the perspective taken 
here, a predictable result of two underlying factors: a) mounting external 
pressure on Suri society from neighbouring groups, especially the 
Nyangatom, which has made them nervous and agressive but also unable 
(yet) to vent this agression against the Nyangatom without risking heavy 
losses, and: b) population pressure and decreased resources in a limited 
area. Resource use and population growth (at least 3.5 per cent per annum 
in the last four years21 ) have led to visible degradation of their immediate 
environment. Village communities live much closer to each other and 
must take each other's fields and bush resources into account, as they 
exploit the same places for gathering, firewood, washing, water, etc .. 
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Relations become more competitive, leading to inter-community rivalry, 
expressed partly in donga contests. 
The fact that young men have taken over the sagine-proceedings indi-
cates their newly gained power-base (guns, cattle) within Suri society. 
Gold exploitation enables them to assert independence from fathers or 
other older agnates (who wish to use their labour as long as possible): they 
do not have to wait so long to start building up their own herd, or to marry. 
A related effect is the increased self-confidence of the Suri after having 
recovered from crisis. This is what village people and the Dizi mean when 
they say the Suri have become 'arrogant', 'saturated' (Amharic: 
t'egabefifia). One sees this in the expression of violence with automatic 
weapons, which has had a kind of cultural effect in itself, tending to stimu-
late a 'cult' of the gun among Suri youngsters. 
Inter-group Relations 
Although gold-mining enabled the Suri to gain cash and expand cattle herds, 
this has not led to repossession of former areas of settlement close to the 
Nyangatom area - which would have eased the abovementioned demo-
graphic and ecological pressures. The system of inter-ethnic relations is as 
strained as ever. One might associate this development with the TGE's new 
ethnic policies but, as is clear from the preceding analysis, deterioriation 
started well before the change of government. The Suri are also still one of 
the least politicized groups in Ethiopia, having avoided the heavy ideologi-
cal pressure on ethnic identity development, etc., through their isolated posi-
tion and limited exposure to highland culture. Remarkably, although they 
know from experience what the highland socio-cultural model of life 
imphes, they are not in the least drawn to it. There is a persistent, largely 
sceptical and negative, image of highland Ethiopians (in Suri: Golach, 
which includes Amhara, Tigray, Gurage, Oromo) as opposed to their own 
self-image as proud, independent cattle-herders with distinctive customs like 
female lip-plates, body decoration, ceremonial duelling, and specific initia-
tion rituals. Change of government has not significantly modified this atti-
tude. The EHADIG is seen as another representative of highland society. 
While the TGE's policy is to stimulate ethnic group self-organization 
and representation on local and regional levels, in the case of the Suri this 
cannot be easily applied. While the Me' en formed a self-organization (not 
a 'party') under EHADIG auspices, the Suri have no interest in this. 
Neither it is likely that they will join the Kafa Peoples' Democratic 
Movement, which has a Dizi academic as one of its leaders. In the Maji 
area, there are serious debates about boundaries, compensation for past 
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raids and killings, resource exploitation and secure trade routes. As long as 
outstanding disputes (on recent Suri expansion into Dizi lands, their 
killing of Dizi leaders and ambushing trading parties in an area jointly 
used by all groups) are not solved, it is difficult to see how regional-ethnic 
autonomy could work. In such conditions, government troops are needed 
as intermediaries maintaining a semblance of law and order. 
Thus, the Suri - and the other groups - do not share in the newly 
propagated political discourse on ethnic group identity. They follow pre-
existing, socio-ecologically rooted, group images, which are partly comple-
mentary and partly antagonistic, and which emanate largely from 
regional-level political group relations and from daily economic concerns. 
Traditional mediatory channels through elders and established ritual 
mechanisms seem to have lost their importance and consensus between 
ethnic groups has given way to confrontation. As this also seriously impairs 
trade and exchange relations, each group unwittingly develops the need to 
rely on its own resources, and to aim at a false self-sufficiency (cf. Abbink 
1994). This response is not simply due to deterioration of the natural envi-
ronment in itself - because in earlier times, conflicts and crises were more 
or less contained and concluded in temporary, ritually sealed, reconcilia-
tion. Such a response is decisively aggravated by the uncontrolled spread of 
modem arms, creating an unpredictable, insecure political environment. As 
such regional problems of proliferation of arms cannot be solved easily -
except by massive disarming - this instability will remain and continue to 
reinforce traditional tensions and overexploitation of precarious resource 
bases for increasing numbers of people. Paradoxically, for the new political 
models of ethnic autonomy and representation to work, a new framework 
of inter-ethnic mediation would be required, to be organized along the lines 
of traditional arrangements, de-emphasizing the usurped power of young-
sters with guns. Development schemes would have to stimulate joint 
involvement of various ethnic groups (because there is no numerically and 
territorially dominant group in the Maji area). 
One development project is currently underway among the Suri - it 
could be seen as another effect of the serious crisis of 1984-5. This is the 
'Surma rehabilitation project', set up by the Lutheran World Federation and 
the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus. From 1989 to 1993 they 
were in a base camp in Turn, the small district capital of Maji zone. Late in 
1993, another base was being built in Tulgit, at the north fringe of the Suri 
area. While the project has missionary aspects (e.g., translating the Bible 
and other Christian texts into Suri) the aims are to open a clinic, improve 
cultivation techniques, give veterinary services, and eventually a open a 
primary school. While medical services have up to now been provided to 
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the Dizi and the Turn townspeople, the Tulgtt project will be geared chiefly 
to the Suri. It will certainly attract a number of Suri youngsters but whether 
it will lead to basic changes in the Suri way of life is doubtful. 
CONCLUSION 
The Suri have been able to get out of their crisis by timely exploitation of 
gold as a cash resource, which was 'invested' back into their transhumant 
pastoral economy, in the form of cattle and weapons. The were able to 
regenerate their reproductive powers in a double sense: more cattle (either 
bought or raided) allowed a quick upsurge in marriages and births; and 
acquisition and use of weapons which permitted self-defence and expan-
sion at the cost of others. Availability of automatic rifles also led to 
changes within Suri society itself: generational tension, territorial disputes, 
and rivalry between Tirma and Chai sub-groups. An unintended effect of 
Suri self-rehabilitation is that the role and use of arms has acquired a cul-
tural momentum of its own, with far-reaching effects on Suri social struc-
ture and on ethnic group relations (cf. Abbink 1994). 
The perhaps atypical recovery of the Suri - which temporarily decreased 
their inter-dependence with other groups in the ethno-system - does not 
solve problems of long-term vulnerability of their environment and way of 
life (this is not something foremost in the Suri mind; they seldom speak of 
the famine of the past and think the weapons give them an enduring power 
base). The main problems of the Suri eco-niche remain: 
1. Unreliable rainfall, affecting pasture and bush resources; 
2. Unstable relations between expanding, competing ethnic populations 
in a partially shared area with limited resources; 
3. Unpredictable (national) government policies; 
4. External threats due to regional conflicts spilling over into adjacent 
areas (Northern Kenya, Southern Sudan). When state influence 
(administrative, military or police presence) is relaxed, local conflicts 
will be played out increasingly by force. A political-administrative 
emphasis on ethnic group identities and boundaries will, most likely, 
not ease group tensions in Maji area, where groups have traditionally 
been partly dependent upon each other. 
While this chapter indicates that disaster-affected people can develop 
their own adaptive response to subsistence crises, and that external aid 
should be geared to that, it is far less certain what must be done if this 
response is formulated, so to speak, at the expense of others. 
JonAbbink 167 
Obviously, indigenous views should be considered, includmg the 
'target' group's possible inclination to reject aid if it has perceived draw-
backs. Sustainable development programmes, insofar as they have any 
long-term chance in a still unfavourable macro-economic setting, should 
be grafted upon serious consideration of local conditions and, in this case, 
implies recognizing Suri wishes to maintain their agro-pastoralist 
economy; taking into account short-term migratory patterns; recognizing 
environmental limits and possibilities for agricultural crops and tech-
niques; respecting the central role of women in family life and in most 
subsistence activities; and acknowledging gathering plants, roots, nuts and 
fruits as important components in their food portfolio. If 'cultivation pro-
jects' are envisaged, examples should be provided in irrigation agriculture 
along the Kibish, but with crops the Suri prefer. Obviously, improvement 
is required in transport, educational and medical facilities, giving the Suri 
a choice to eventually participate in the regional or national economy. This 
applies to the (multi-ethnic) region as a whole. 
There must be a response to eventual Suri desires to enter into more 
close relations with other groups or government agencies, but they should 
not be forced into a marginal economy which destroys the remarkable 
measure of self-reliance and cultural stability they now possess. 
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Notes 
1. This figure is based on census work in 1991-2. Existing statistics on the 
Suri/Surma are scarce and unreliable. The local administration in Majt 
keeps no population records for them. In 1985, World Vision International 
made a preliminary census and came to an estimated, but inflated, figure of 
about 35,000. This was during the famine. 
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2. I exclude here the Bale or Balethi people who might be considered a third 
Suri group (see Lyth 1947). They are closely related, especially to the Tirma 
and number about 8000. However, most live in Sudan east of the Boma 
plateau. 
3. The Suri have repeatedly stolen unattended things from tourists. They see the 
tourists' behaviour as unresponsive, exploitative and non-reciprocal and basi-
cally do not understand what they want. In the meantime, the security situa-
tion in the area (late 1993- early 1994) has deteriorated so much that to visit 
the Suri as a tourist would be near-suicidal (see Abbink 1993). Organized 
excursions were halted several years ago and a new effort in October 1993 
failed. For a kind of 'tourist view' of the Suri, see Beckwith and Fisher 
(1990;1991), interesting but in several ways inappropriate accounts. 
4. See T. Girard, report of abortive Suri survey, SUE Reports (Addis Ababa) 
no. 4 (1993):10-24, and G. Dimmendaal on the Suri/Mursi and related 
groups, ibid., 26-7. Cf. J. Abbink, 'Suri-English Basic Vocabulary', 
Frankfurter Afrikanische Bliitter, forthcoming. 
5. For these data see the National Atlas of Ethiopia, pp. 7-8, 10-12, 18. 
6. Also, Western tourists with a permit obtained from Addis Ababa's 
Ethiopian National Tourist Organization (for thousands of US dollars) 
hunted in the area, much resented by local people. 
7. This was the longest genealogy I could find (among the Chai Suri). 
8. Information from Abba Fanta Yimer, a senior resident of Maji (July 1993). 
He was a soldier in the area shortly after Aberra's exploits in the early 
decades of this century. 
9. Cf. Viezzer (1938) and Rizetto (1941) for the earliest reports on the Suri 
area. 
10. See Turton (1987) for a study of the effects of the Omo National Park on the 
Mursi. 
11. A mission with a small airstrip and a clinic was built in Merdur in the Tirma 
area. It was abandoned in the 1970s when the Ethiopian government 
accused all American missionaries of being CIA agents. The buildings and 
materials were later destroyed and used by local people. 
12. Even in this emergency period, several unfortunate incidents troubled rela-
tionships between Suri and outside agencies. One instance was the follow-
ing: in Jeba village a government shack contained bags of powdery poison 
for treating crops. The Suri learned of this and believed it to be flour that 
was being withheld from them. One night they stole the bags and when they 
later used the contents to prepare flour porridge, several people died. They 
then blamed the village people and the administration for trying to poison 
them. 
13. There had been some half-hearted rehabilitation attempts by the RRC and 
World Vision International, meant to introduce farming in the Kibish area 
but tt>ese were unsuccessful. Another attempt was made in 1985 when about 
five hundred Suri were taken outside the area to be 'trained in farming' (see 
Abbink 1992). This was also a failure, as 85 per cent of the migrants 
returned to their area of origin; the high rate of return migration also indi-
cates that the Suri were successful in gradually restoring their traditional 
subsistence base in their home area, on which they knew they would depend 
in the future. 
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14. Some of this information was confirmed to me 'by Professor Serge Tornay 
(Universite de Paris, Nanterre), foremost expert on the Nyangatom, in 
private conversation in Addis Ababa (January 1992) and in subsequent 
letters. 
15. The EHADIG force in Maji have no Suri members. 
16. In November 1993, a large-scale battle between Suri and EHADIG forces 
erupted, after Suri killed some EHADIG soldiers. EHADIG patience and 
restraint had already been severely tried when the Suri shot and killed one 
of their men in April 1993 and later defiantly exhumed and burnt the corpse. 
The night-long battle left many Suri dead and may have been a turning point 
in relations of the Suri with other groups in the area. 
17. As mentioned in two recent films about the Mursi, The Land is Bad and 
Nitha (D. Turton and L. Woodhead, Granada Television, 1991). 
18. This wealth is, however, not converted or reckoned in money but in terms of 
reproductive powers (family) and social standing (alliances) within their 
own society. 
19. Suri (after the Kibish food distribution point was closed) continued to visit 
Dima refugee camp (for Sudanese refugees) to obtain food. It was located 
on the Akobo river, a two-day walk north, and was a major training and 
support base for the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), supported by 
the Mengistu regime. Retreating SPLA troops pillaged the camp in June 
1991. 
20. Based on field census data 1991. 
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